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Abstract
What can street gangs tell us about radicalization and extremist groups?
At first glance, these two groups seem to push the boundaries of
comparison. In this article, we examine the important similarities and
differences across criminal, deviant, and extremist groups. Drawing from
research on street gangs, this article explores issues such as levels of
explanation,organizational structure, group process, and the increasingly
important role of technology and the Internet in the context of
radicalization. There are points of convergence across these groups, but
it is important to understand the differences between these groups. This
review finds little evidence to support the contention that American
street gangs are becoming increasingly radicalized. This conclusion is
based largely on organizational differences between gangs and terror
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Introduction
Concern over radicalization has increased over the past decade. Indeed, 
radicalization is seen as a core motivating force behind involvement in 
terror, and in some cases de-radicalization is seen as an effective strategy 
against groups involved in terrorism.1, 2 The presence of radicalized 
beliefs is problematic to the extent that such beliefs result in action, a dis-
tinction made by Atran.3 Examples of such action vary from the attacks 
on youth and government employees in Oslo, Norway by a right-wing 
extremist in opposition to multiculturalism, to the bombings of military 
Abstract
What can street gangs tell us about radicalization and extremist groups? 
At first glance, these two groups seem to push the boundaries of compari-
son. In this article, we examine the important similarities and differences 
across criminal, deviant, and extremist groups. Drawing from research on 
street gangs, this article explores issues such as levels of explanation, 
organizational structure, group process, and the increasingly important 
role of technology and the Internet in the context of radicalization. There 
are points of convergence across these groups, but it is important to 
understand the differences between these groups. This review finds little 
evidence to support the contention that American street gangs are becom-
ing increasingly radicalized. This conclusion is based largely on organiza-
tional differences between gangs and terror groups.
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training centers in Charsadda, Pakistan, and to the Taliban avenging the 
death of Usama bin Ladin. That said, there is an important difference 
between holding radicalized beliefs and engaging in radicalized actions.
To date, however, concern over radicalization has focused overwhelm-
ingly on Islamic terrorist groups. Right-wing extremism, religious cults, 
and gangs have been omitted from serious study of the process of radical-
ization. As Schmid and Pierce noted: "Surprisingly few studies compare 
radicalization to terrorism to the joining of organized crime groups or 
religious sects."4 One important exception to this trend is the recent con-
ference and activities jointly sponsored by Google Ideas, The Tribeca Film 
Festival, and the Council of Foreign Relations. The Summit Against Vio-
lent Extremism (SAVE) held in Dublin, Ireland in June 2011, examined 
the role of the Internet—specifically chat rooms, video posts, and social 
networking—in recruitment to extremist groups and in separating from 
such groups.5 Radicalization may be facilitated through technology, and 
web-based recruitment poses a considerable problem for the spread of 
radicalized beliefs that can be mobilized for terror activity. Chat rooms 
have become a source of radicalization among some groups.6
The article examines the issue of radicalization in the context of street 
gangs. Our main objective is to consider what research on gangs can tell 
us about radicalization and violent extremism, primarily in the United 
States. We begin by discussing radicalization in relation to what Jim 
Short, gang researcher and sociologist, referred to as the "level of explana-
tion problem" that exists within criminology in general and gang research 
in particular. Next, we provide a basis to compare gangs to other types of 
criminal and/or extremist groups. In doing so, we consider the organiza-
tional structure of groups that organize themselves for criminal behavior, 
including terror groups, drug smugglers, organized crime, religious cults, 
and right-wing hate groups. This is followed by a discussion of the 
increasingly important role of technology and the Internet in the struc-
ture and processes of criminal and extremist groups. We conclude by 
offering what gangs can and cannot tell us about extremist studies. Our 
central thesis is that there is no evidence of a direct or even indirect link 
between terrorist groups and street gangs, and that very few gang mem-
bers experience radicalization towards terrorism, or political or religious 
extremism, even while in prison. We believe that the differences in orga-
nizational structure and a generalized lack of political or religious belief 
systems among gang members accounts for this conclusion.
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Radicalization, Levels of Explanation, and 
Gang Research
Borum defines radicalization as "the process of developing extremist 
ideologies and beliefs."7 He places an emphasis on the role of "action 
pathways" or "action scripts" as critical to understanding how extremist 
ideologies and beliefs are translated into "terrorism or violent extremist 
actions." Radicalization processes and extremist ideologies and actions 
are multilayered. Peeling back these layers reveals a host of important 
issues involving public policy, social and economic factors, group 
processes, belief systems, and individual motivations and predispositions. 
Researchers of youth and street gangs have been disentangling this web of 
complexity for nearly a century and may lend conceptual clarity to several 
of these issues. Gangs and gang violence are found throughout the world, 
much like radical and extremist groups.8 Our central argument is that 
there is more convergence across criminal and extremist groups than 
divergence, such that knowledge about the structure and processes of 
street gangs can inform our understanding of extremist groups and vice-
versa.
Short maintains that the field of criminology suffers from a level of 
explanation problem in understanding its key dependent variable—
handicapping theory and policy development—and that this problem is 
most identifiable in the context of gangs.9 Short argues that we know very 
little about how levels of explanation "cross paths" and relate to one 
another. Implicit in this discussion are clearly defined units of analysis: 
macro-, group-, and individual-level—in other words, communities (or 
cities), gangs, and gang members. From this perspective, it is important 
to link explanations of behavior in accounting for outcomes. For example, 
it is important to understand individual risk factors, group 
characteristics, and structural variables when explaining gang behavior. 
Theories explaining gang emergence do not translate fluidly to explaining 
gang membership. This logic naturally extends to radicalization processes 
and extremist groups and has implications for how theories are developed 
and policies are crafted. For example, the radicalization process for 
individuals entering extremist groups may differ from the forces 
influencing the emergence of such groups. Similarly, the forces 
influencing the emergence of extremist groups may differ from the 
processes influencing terrorist or extremist actions. It is important to 
distinguish between explanatory variables and outcomes to avoid 
muddying the waters, but it is even more important to understand the 
relationships between levels of explanation.
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At the risk of ignoring our own advice, this article concentrates on gangs 
as groups because understanding how individuals organize themselves is 
a key issue in the study of radicalization. Organizational structure affects 
the three key processes in the criminal activities of such groups: recruit-
ment and joining, group process, and desistance. A key point in this arti-
cle is that while there is some degree of convergence among groups that 
commit crime, there are important differences, particularly in the degree 
of radicalization. We argue that radicalization is important to understand 
in the context of its ability to encourage the behavior of members and 
enhance group activity. Building on this, we offer lessons in responding to 
gangs.
The Organizational Structure of Gangs
Understanding the organizational structure of a gang is an important 
basis for comparing gangs with other groups involved in crime. Gang 
structure has implications for understanding the influence of the group 
on the behavior of individual members.10 In other words, we need to 
understand what motivates individuals to do in a group what they would 
not do as an individual, a phenomenon referred to as group process and 
one that is present across a variety of different groups. The group process 
is a powerful force in motivating individuals to join terrorist groups and 
engage in terrorist acts. In addition, a radicalized belief system plays a key 
role in such motivation.
Gang organization shows considerable variation and can best be seen on a 
continuum. At one extreme, gangs are described as highly organized 
groups, while at the other they are described as ineffective social mecha-
nisms, which lack key features of organizational structure.11 The former 
may be thought of as instrumental-rational (organized) and the latter as 
informal-diffuse (disorganized) models of gang organization. These ideal 
types were developed during the debate over the extent to which gangs 
controlled the increasingly violent U.S. street-drug markets in the 1990s. 
Hagedorn contrasted organized drug distributors with "freelance" drug 
dealers, concluding that the latter was a description more consistent with 
the data.12 Importantly, Morselli discovered that gang members partici-
pate in a number of different crimes and groups, in addition to those com-
mitted with their own gang.13 He notes that while some of their crimes are 
linked to their membership in the gang, others clearly are not. The 
research on gang organization has expanded beyond drug selling to areas 
such as the penetration of gangs into community organization and the 
ability of gangs to organize homicide.14, 15
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The Instrumental-Rational Perspective
The instrumental-rational perspective identifies a vertical structure to 
gangs that enables them to enforce discipline among their members and 
effectively define and achieve group ends. Additional measures of 
instrumental-rational depictions of gang organization include age-graded 
levels of membership, leadership roles, regularly attended meetings, 
coordinated drug sales, written rules and codes of conduct, expansion 
into legitimate business operations, and ties and influence in the political 
process.16 This description finds support in research from Detroit, 
Chicago, and some California prison gangs.17 The "Black Kings" of 
Chicago possessed extensive power in the community, enough to 
influence community affairs.18 The gang was able to "convince" the 
neighborhood "Council" (nominated leaders of buildings) that the gang 
could provide security to the neighborhood. In turn, this strengthened the 
operations of the gang's hierarchically-structured drug distribution ring. 
The gang was so well organized that each "constituent [gang] set was tied 
to the overall organization through trademark and fiduciary 
responsibilities."19 To date, however, additional evidence in support of 
this perspective is sparse. Interestingly, none of this research suggests 
that the instrumental-rational perspective is associated with a 
differentiated belief system, much less radicalization.
The Informal-Diffuse Perspective
The informal-diffuse perspective characterizes gangs as self-interested 
groups who mostly sell drugs to profit themselves, not their gang. Leader-
ship is functional and situational, membership is generally short-lived, 
formal gang practices are rare, and well-known and regulated codes of 
conduct are limited to secrecy and loyalty. Perhaps most tellingly, gang 
members distribute drugs for individual, not collective, ends. It is far 
more common for gang members to "freelance" as drug dealers.20 While 
gang members are involved in a considerable amount of crime, their crim-
inality is adaptive and does not reflect loyalty to the gang. Further, gang 
membership is transitory, lasting roughly two years.21 Examples of these 
descriptions are widespread in the literature.22 From this perspective, 
gangs seem to be quite effective at fulfilling a variety of symbolic func-
tions—including friendship, revenge, and peer affiliation—that are largely 
independent of instrumental concerns such as making money or achiev-
ing concrete political or religious ends. In this regard, gangs resemble ter-
rorist groups, whose members are often attracted by the opportunities for 
peer affiliation. Nevertheless, most gangs, and some gang activity, display 
a certain level and type of organization, despite Bovenkerk's observation 
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that gangs are largely flat and without prominent leadership.23 After all, 
the necessary properties must be intact for a gang to be a group. As they 
lack effective mechanisms for controlling the behavior of their members 
in an effective fashion, gangs have not evolved into more formal organiza-
tions that could foster terrorism or be targets for increased radicalization. 
Indeed, most gang members are characterized by the lack of a political or 
religious orientation. This is most pronounced among the modal age cate-
gories of street gang members—teenagers—as well as older gang mem-
bers, many of whom have been to prison.
More organized gangs produce more crime and victimization. Member-
ship in more organized gangs is associated with higher levels of serious 
crime and delinquency.24 Support for this hypothesis has been found for 
offenses such as drug sales, robberies, and gun carrying.25 Decker et al. 
found that members of more organized gangs were more likely to experi-
ence violent victimizations, and that those members of more organized 
gangs engaged in higher levels of violent offending and drug selling.26 In a 
cross-national analysis, based on youth gang members from twelve U.S. 
cities and several cities in Trinidad and Tobago, Pyrooz et al. found a 
modest relationship between gang organization, offending, and victimiza-
tion. Though these gangs were not well-organized, even a modest level of 
organization produced higher levels of crime and victimization.27 Because 
higher levels of organization among gangs produce higher levels of crimi-
nal involvement, it is useful to compare gangs with other criminal groups.
Gangs and Other Criminal Groups
Street gangs are but one form of criminal organization. Street gangs are 
generally defined as street-oriented groups, whose membership is youth-
ful, that exhibit persistence across time and for whom illegal activity con-
stitutes a part of group identity.28 Interestingly, a belief system is not 
generally found as a defining feature of gangs. Scholars have attempted to 
understand gangs in the broader context of other groups, particularly 
groups involved in crime. As Morselli has noted, however, an association 
of criminals is not the same as a criminal association, and gangs more 
commonly represent the former.29 It is important to compare gangs to 
other groups involved in crime, including organized crime, terrorism, 
drug smuggling, human trafficking, and groups involved in political 
extremism. Such a comparison highlights the similarities and differences 
between the groups and increases our ability to develop effective 
responses. It is useful to compare gangs to other groups and networks on 
the basis of their structure, processes, cultural orientations, and activities. 
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These concepts play a role in the understanding of other crime groups, 
particularly more organized forms of crime groups, thus their relevance to 
our work. We contrast gangs to such groups to highlight the differences.
Five key points serve to distinguish gangs from other criminal 
associations:
1. goals with symbolic ends, as opposed to economic, political, or religious 
ends are more important to street gangs
2. organizational structure that is looser, reflecting the age structure of 
gangs
3. short-lived cooperation, in combination with diminished levels of lead-
ership and structure in contrast to groups that require more organiza-
tion in the pursuit of goals
4. membership patterns that are transitory, with members staying in the 
group on average less than two years and being weakly tied to the 
group
5. turf, territory, or place that holds identifiable and defendable signifi-
cance to gangs, going well beyond residential or community purposes
In one of the few pieces to consider the topic, Curry examined the rela-
tionships between gangs and terrorist groups.30 While he found a number 
of similarities, the differences were substantial. The members of both 
groups are primarily male, violence is common in both groups, solidarity 
and elements of collective behavior operate in both groups, and the vio-
lence used by both groups often represents a form of "self-help," or 
attempts to redress wrongs. The differences included a profit motive for 
gangs that is largely absent for terrorist groups, cross-national connec-
tions maintained by terror groups, the diversity in different types of crime 
that typifies gang crime, and an ideological belief among members of ter-
ror groups that is not present among gang members. Most of the similari-
ties between the groups reflect the fact that terrorist groups are less 
structured than is publicly believed.31
A key differentiation between gangs and organized crime groups is that 
organized crime groups typically reinvest the profits from their crimes to 
further the group. There is a growing divide among those who study orga-
nized crime, as many observers see organized crime groups in ways that 
are consistent with networking theory while others describe them in 
terms consistent with a hierarchical structure.32 Gangs exhibit a great 
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deal more fluidity and a far more dynamic structure than that of the 
descriptions of organized crime, and the ties between gang members and 
their gang are considerably weaker. Felson identified this as the "Big 
Gang Theory"—an approach that describes gangs as having the capacity to 
exact revenge and retaliation in a manner similar to mafia-like organiza-
tions.33 Howell held this as one of the key myths about gangs:
"The myth of formal organization, that gangs were becoming 
large, powerful criminal organizations—much like highly struc-
tured corporations—became widely accepted... Very few youth 
gangs, [however,] meet the essential criteria for classification as 
'organized crime.'"34
There is growing evidence from European scholars that organized crime 
groups may lack much of the organizational structure attributed to them 
as well.35 Organized crime groups lack the political motivation that drives 
terror groups, seek to avoid public scrutiny, and engage in highly targeted, 
instrumentally focused activities.36 Terror groups seek publicity for their 
cause and act largely from expressive motivations. Sageman argued that 
terror groups are far less organized than is the popular—or government—
view.37 He described Middle Eastern terror groups as "leaderless jihad," 
and characterized them as groups whose members typically belong for a 
couple of years, who engage in other crimes along with terror, and who 
are, in the main, not strongly bonded to their group. Much of the recent 
analysis of groups involved in terrorism suggests that their organizational 
structure is less vertical and that membership is less permanent than 
many had suggested earlier, resembling the informal-diffuse descriptions 
of gang organization.38
The organizational structure of offending groups such as drug smugglers 
is also of interest in the comparison to gangs. With the great profits to be 
reaped, it is often assumed that drug smuggling must be a highly orga-
nized activity. As with gangs, however, drug smuggling generally lacks the 
corporate organizational structure often ascribed to it. Williams held that 
international drug smuggling was horizontally organized, with small 
groups of individuals well-known to each other responsible for most of its 
functions.39 Zaitch's study of cocaine smuggling from Columbia to the 
Netherlands documented the role of ethnicity and kinship relations in a 
business that depended on informal trust and established relationships 
more than on formal agreements or structures.40 Similarly, Decker and 
Chapman identified discrete cells of smugglers largely disconnected from 
each other in the chain from coca processing to delivery.41 Morselli's work 
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reflected a similar picture of organizational structure.42 These groups are 
flatter, more informal, and less hierarchical than has been described pre-
viously. In these regards, they resemble gangs.
The organizational structure of groups involved in human trafficking and 
smuggling has been described in similar terms. Aronowitz, Zhang, and 
Turner and Kelly identified such groups as small networks of individuals 
that function largely without a hierarchy or system of internal disci-
pline.43 Aronowitz and Turner and Kelly each underscore the role of local 
culture and historical practices as key characteristics that affect how such 
groups organize themselves. Zhang offered a similar description of flat-
tened organizations, with little role differentiation, and few recognized 
leaders. In spite of the large profits and international range, such groups 
depend largely on "trust" and personal relationships more than on formal 
role definitions. Such groups function as "temporary business alliances" 
that include individuals who also engage in other business activities—
legitimate and illegal. In his review of the organizational structure of drug 
distribution networks, organized crime groups, and street gangs, Morselli 
argued that these groups were de-centralized and had flat structures that 
reflected a "flexible order" with an adaptable set of relations.44 This struc-
ture enabled the group to more effectively complete tasks while avoiding 
detection by the criminal justice system. These loosely confederated net-
works are the antithesis of vertically structured hierarchical crime groups. 
They are also the antithesis of gangs, which are characterized by undisci-
plined behavior, diverse offending patterns, and lack of discipline among 
their members.
The Emerging Role of Technology in 
Criminal Groups
Many organized crime groups, drug smugglers, human traffickers and 
smugglers, and terrorists have access to information and technology that 
allows them to operate independently of larger organizational structures. 
Small, loosely organized self-contained groups can better avoid detection 
by law enforcement. Indeed, some argue that the availability of technol-
ogy and web-based information creates opportunities for such groups.45 
These groups form networks as described by Varese.46 The organized 
crime group he describes acts as a series of loosely connected nodes (indi-
viduals, organizations, firms, and information-sharing tools), which 
depend on expertise and information rather than hierarchy and function. 
Some have identified a transformation in the nature of many of these 
forms of crime made possible by technology.47 The "leaderless nexus" he 
describes is a consequence of the decentralization that characterizes activ-
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ities in the information age, where access to data, not labor, is the key to 
achieving instrumental goals. As a consequence, much crime no longer 
requires large numbers of more-or-less well-controlled individuals. Now, 
a small number of individuals can execute criminal acts through the use of 
technology in small groups.
We have yet to see the emergence of such processes among gangs. Gangs, 
however, engage in considerable use of the Internet, employing social net-
working sites and using YouTube to post videos of fights that often spark 
retaliation. The Internet plays a central role in the evolution of gangs and 
radicalization because of the ability to broadcast key symbols, images, and 
rhetoric worldwide in a matter of minutes. For example, someone can 
query "gang fight" or "gang shooting" or "gang initiation" on YouTube and 
view (literally) thousands of videos displaying gang-related activities. The 
same channels of information are available to hate groups, or any extrem-
ist group, to spread ideological beliefs and messages. The difference for 
gangs, however, is that the message typically does not involve increasing 
membership rates or encouraging violence against political or racial coun-
terparts. To the contrary, the goal for gangs is to represent, demonstrate 
toughness, and exhibit bravado. Nevertheless, just like other aspects of 
youth culture, gang culture spreads through music, video, and other 
sources of media. As one former Phoenix gang member told us, "while 
there was gang activity out here before, [the Los Angeles-based movie 
Colors] really taught us how to gangbang [engage in violent attacks on 
other gang members]." It appears that YouTube and related websites have 
eclipsed mainstream media sources—news, television, movies—as the 
source of new information that was not available to gang members two 
decades ago.48 How this information impacts gangs, extremist groups, 
and the transfer of radicalized beliefs and images across the globe should 
be a high priority for future research.
Conclusion
We have learned many lessons from this discussion of gangs and radical-
ization. First, it is important not to be guided by media or popular images 
in identifying new trends and patterns of behaviors. There is some degree 
of convergence in the organizational structures and processes of groups 
that organize to commit crime. Currently the differences remain more 
important than the similarities. Our goal is to better understand these 
groups' similarities and differences. Based on our review, however, we 
urge caution in conflating gangs with other types of extremist groups.
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Second, the organizational structure of the group matters. More highly 
structured groups include certain efficiencies and scope of tasks. Many 
organized crime groups (terrorists, gang members, and drug and human 
smugglers), however, appear to have a flatter organizational structure 
than traditionally believed. Street gangs appear to be less formal and 
more diffuse than these other groups. This may account for the general-
ized lack of radicalization within their ranks.
Third, groups do not have to be radicalized to be dangerous. Gang mem-
bers appear to lack the characteristics of radicalization that characterize 
many terror or right-wing hate groups, but that does not make them less 
violent or less involved in crime. Indeed, among crime groups, gangs may 
be more involved in crime on a per capita basis than any of the other 
groups. As marginalized individuals and groups, there is concern about 
the potential for radicalization among gangs and gang members. Concern 
over the potential for radicalization exists because many gang members 
go to prison each year, where they come into contact with radicalized indi-
viduals and groups and are subject to recruitment and influence.
Fourth, the Internet is of growing importance to the function of gangs but 
does not yet appear to be a direct primary means of recruitment. That 
said, Internet-based forms of communication play a key role in the trans-
mission of gang symbols, practice, and images. As Decker and Pyrooz doc-
ument, the cultural transmission of gang images plays an important role 
in the emergence of gang forms in new countries and cultures.49 There is 
less evidence, however that chat rooms play a role comparable in gang 
recruitment to the one they play for terror groups or right-wing extrem-
ists. What is unclear at this point is whether technology is facilitating new 
kinds of criminal activity or supporting traditional forms of criminal 
activity among gang members. That said, this remains an unexplored 
topic for offenders in general, one that needs considerable empirical and 
conceptual work.
We conclude by noting that radicalization is an extremely fluid state, one 
in which change is the norm. Modern technology advances the motives 
and accelerates the methods of radicalization. Developing fixed images of 
groups, their activities, structures, and processes will likely lead to errors 
in assessing their danger. There is an axis of continuity across criminal, 
deviant, and extremist groups that, when explored, will bring a better 
understanding to radicalization processes. We encourage both conceptual 
and empirical comparative approaches as fruitful avenues of future 
inquiry.
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